By Lee Gunn | 20 October 2009
Article Highlights

   * Although the United States has faced many threats over the last few ecades, climate change may be the most ominous.
   * Specifically, it will contribute to resource scarcity, state failure, increasingly mobile populations, and regional instability.
   * The U.S. military may not be the best body to tackle climate change, but it still should be quick to reassess its global engagement strategy and be proactive in minimizing the effects of climate change
on U.S. and international security.

The United States currently faces one of its greatest and most
misunderstood threats: climate change. And as changing climate patterns
affect the water supplies critical to human life and agriculture, as sea
levels rise and threaten coastal communities, and as changes in the
environment increasingly weaken marginal states, the implications for U.S.
defense will only grow.

Specifically, instability and conflict abroad will affect three important
dimensions of U.S. national security: how the United States chooses to use
its power, how and where the U.S. military operates around the world, and
with whom Washington will and will not ally itself.

How power is applied. As societies struggle to adapt to changing climate
conditions, the U.S. military will be called on more frequently to provide
assistance, support governments, fight extremism in weak states, and
anticipate natural and human-made disasters. In short, Washington will
have to consider carefully why U.S. defense forces fight.

Take Central and South Asia, for example. The region's main water
source--the Himalayan glaciers--continues to recede due to climate change.
The trend will no doubt lead to a dramatic reduction in freshwater
availability, particularly in Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, and parts of
China. In fact, a 2007 U.S. Marine Corps report ranks Afghanistan,
Pakistan, and India in the top 10 states at risk of instability and
violent conflict over water.

A fight for resources among these states--which are already mired in
violence and mutual suspicion--would be disastrous for U.S. security
interests in the region, particularly since declining conditions among
poor segments of the population would be a boon for terrorist and
extremist groups' recruitment. Climate-intensified conflict between mobile
populations seeking fresh water amid wanton state instability may prompt
future policy makers to deploy U.S. forces not only to combat extremism in
the region, but also to provide aid to the hungry and displaced.

How and where the military operates. Climate change also will force a
reevaluation of how the United States operates its forces around the
world. Facilities, logistics, and strategic planning will need to be
reassessed. The British Indian Ocean Territory of Diego Garcia, for
example, is home to a critical staging facility for U.S. and British naval
and air forces operating in the Middle East and Central Asia. But this
atoll sits just a few feet above sea level. If sea levels rise as
projected, PDF the facility could be lost, forcing the U.S. and British
militaries to adapt and adjust their logistics and operations throughout
the region.

Who will U.S. allies be? Changing climate conditions also will test
traditional alliances and may even inspire unexpected new ones as states
grapple with altered topographies, climate refugees, and changes in
commercial and economic circumstances.

For instance, the U.S. Navy has been concerned about the loss of sea ice
in the Arctic for nearly a decade. Specifically, it worries that as the
fabled Northwest Passage opens, military and commercial activities there
will increase. One need not look further than the 2007 Russian expedition
that planted its flag on the seabed at the North Pole. Not surprisingly,
Canada, Norway, Denmark, and the United States--all bordering the
Arctic--reacted critically to Russia's perceived act of encroachment.

In addition, the effects of climate change could strain U.S. relations
with Mexico. As Latin American water and arable land resources decline,
poverty and internal unrest are likely to spread in the region, leading to
increased human migration northward--both legal and illegal. Mexico's
perceived inability to staunch the flow north would likely raise tensions
with Washington, hampering U.S. collaboration in the fight against
Mexico-based drug cartels.

Given all of this, the decision, therefore, isn't whether U.S. planners
and strategists should adapt and prepare, but how they should adapt and
prepare. Looking ahead, China is predicting the loss of 5-10 percent of
its wheat harvest by 2030 due to climate change. In southern Sudan and the
Darfur region, existing conflicts will be severely exacerbated by
increasingly scarce water, food, and arable land. Responding to these and
myriad other climate-influenced changes presents great challenges for the
United States and the international community--far beyond the specific
capabilities of the U.S. military.

Thus, here's how Washington should begin preparing for the consequences
associated with climate change:

   * Invest in capabilities within the U.S. government (including the
Defense Department) to manage the humanitarian crises--such as a new
flow of “climate refugees”--that may accompany climate change and
subsequently overwhelm local governments and threaten critical U.S.
interests;
   * Prepare military officers and troops to address the security and
humanitarian needs of resource-stressed populations and climate
refugees;
   * Expand global public health programs (e.g., malarial eradication);
   * Negotiate an agreement with Canada and Mexico to govern the use of
fresh water in North America;
   * Lead the world in developing conflict-resolution mechanisms to
mediate between climate change's winners and losers.

If it doesn't take these steps, the United States will be ill-equipped to
face climate-induced threats when they're most acute, forcing future
generations to deal with a world full of conflict, disease, hunger,
displacement, and extremism.