By Aileen S.P. Baviera

MANILA, Philippines—The global condemnation of the brutal crackdown on Buddhist monks and pro-democracy activists has not loosened the military junta’s grip on power in Burma.

Despite the fresh sanctions imposed by the European Union, the United States and Japan, the generals are far from granting the demands of the tens of thousands of protesters who marched through Rangoon and other cities in Burma in August and September.

The protesters demanded the lowering of consumer prices, release of Aung San Suu Kyi and other political prisoners, and national reconciliation.

Weeks after soldiers fired at marchers in Rangoon and descended on monasteries, the arrest of activists continued. The ruling junta acknowledged that 10 people were killed, but opposition groups in exile said that the death toll was much higher and that thousands of people were held in brutal conditions.

State media insisted that there were no political prisoners in the country and criticized a UN Security Council statement slamming the bloody crackdown.

How do you solve a problem like Burma? The dean of the Asian Center at the University of the Philippines has come up with several recommendations, including a multilateral effort demanding that the junta hold a dialogue with the opposition.

Burma poses a dilemma for its neighboring countries.

On the one hand, the strategic value of its location and its oil and gas resources makes it very attractive for its neighbors, especially China and India.

On the other, its repressive regime is seen as a threat mainly to its own people, but this repression has led to spill-over effects, e.g. refugees in neighboring states and loss of credibility of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) in its relations with Europe.

In the Burma policies of neighboring states, it is national interest—rather than values such as the promotion of democracy or human rights—
that prevails. If we wish these neighbors to pressure or influence the junta toward democratic reform, we need to persuade them that democracy and human rights in Burma are in their national interest, too.

China’s dilemma

China, perceived as Burma’s key ally, has come under increasing international pressure to prevent further repression by the junta. China’s interests in Burma include access to the Indian Ocean (it has helped Burma develop a naval base), oil and gas, an active border trade, and using Burma as a buffer against India. Through its influence over Burma, it also has a foothold in Asean. China is thus unlikely to antagonize the military junta.

Moreover, China consistently touts the principle of “noninterference in internal affairs” and holds respect for state sovereignty practically sacred, if only to protect itself against possible encroachments on sovereignty by greater powers. Thus, it will not be the first to intervene in Rangoon.

In addition, human rights and democracy are clearly not China’s strong points. We remember that the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown shortly followed the 1988 Rangoon massacres. If China openly presses the Burma junta against violent suppression of protests, this may raise questions about the need to renounce its own crackdown on the 1989 Tiananmen dissent. This is something China’s leaders are not prepared to do, as it may encourage other mass pro-democracy movements in China.

We should, however, avoid overestimating China’s influence over Burma. After all, Burma has a long tradition of neutrality and isolationism since the 1950s, and in particular, resistance to Chinese interference, which it abandoned only after 1988 partly because of sanctions by the West.

Trade and investment

Given a chance, it is likely that the people of Burma may wish to return to this path of neutrality in contrast to alignment with big powers, as it is so crucial to their survival. Moreover, China is not its only significant or even major trade and investment partner (Singapore, Thailand, India, Japan also count, among others). See table.

Indeed, China has provided the military regime with increasing assistance in transportation, energy, mining, military, industrial, cultural and other infrastructure, such that, if it so wanted, it is in a position to press the junta. However, Chinese weight alone will not be enough.

Finally, before the whole world demands that China put pressure on the Burmese junta (the same way it has been expected to influence the North Korean regime), we should stop and think that perhaps we should be careful of what we wish for. Do we really want China to become a power broker in Southeast Asia? What could be the long-term consequences of allowing it to become a guarantor of any country’s sovereignty and security, or for that matter, any regime’s legitimacy, in our part of the world?

Asean’s dilemma

The decision by Asean to admit Burma as a member was in large part anchored on the vision of a united Southeast Asia, the need to counter growing Chinese influence over the regime, and the desire to keep the regime constructively engaged in the face of the policy of isolation and sanctions by the West and the United States.

However, the junta has shown itself resistant to any change urged by Asean, because it knows Asean countries themselves are not united on democracy and human rights, and many are still wedded to the noninterference principle.

Following the coup d’etat in Thailand that overthrew the Thaksin government, only Indonesia and the Philippines are seen as committed to human rights, but even in the Philippines this commitment on the part of the political elite is shaky.

We should remember that Thailand is also ruled by a military junta while Vietnam, Laos, Singapore, Malaysia and Brunei are under different degrees of authoritarian rule.

Because most Asean governments would rather look at Burma as a market, an investment destination, or in terms of its strategic value, civil society organizations in the Asean region face the challenge of persuading their governments that genuine stability and prosperity in Burma can only come through political dialogue, and with the junta relaxing its grip on power. Singapore should be especially targeted because it is a major trade and investment partner and a major source of military and police assistance to the regime.

Charter

Another dimension of Asean affected by the crisis in Burma is its charter-drafting process. Among the hurdles here is the problem of ensuring the states’ commitment to any new rules of the association. Questions have been raised as to whether member states found to be in violation can be sanctioned through suspension, expulsion, or other means.

The debate in the past centered around the expectation of some that Burma’s military junta would continue to behave ignominiously as before, dismissive of international norms. The current crisis and Asean’s inability to contribute to its peaceful resolution will only invite further skepticism about Asean by drawing attention to its being inutile in ensuring responsible and peaceful behavior by a member state, even with respect to its own people.

If agreement on a charter were to be announced in a regional atmosphere poisoned by the beating of monks and continuing arrests of peaceful demonstrators in a member country, Asean might indeed deservedly become a laughing stock.

Perhaps Asean should already consider the Burma crisis in relation to the timing of its announcement of its charter. Asean leaders could explore postponing the charter decision until the junta demonstrates a stronger commitment to political reform, and even explore using the charter issue to demonstrate to the junta the urgent need for measures to accommodate the legitimate democratic opposition. There is a precedent to such a postponement of a major Asean decision. The deferment of Cambodia’s entry into Asean in 1997-98 was due to the internal disorder among its elite factions at the time.

India’s dilemma

There has also been a lot of international pressure on India to withdraw its support for the Burmese junta. India feels the need to wield influence over the junta for one overriding purpose—not democracy or human rights—but to balance China’s growing power. India also is very much interested in Burma’s oil and gas resources. However, India should realize that for as long as the junta remains in power, China is bound to play an important role in propping it up.

Over the long term, a democratic Burma is much more likely to be friendly toward a democratic India. Therefore, the earlier democracy can be established in Burma, the better it will be for India.

US-EU-UN

As for the United States, Europe and the United Nations, their sanctions have failed to produce change just as Asean’s so-called constructive engagement has failed.

Western sanctions may in fact have given China free rein over the junta as well as the Burmese economy, and there has been no lack of Asian or foreign companies seeking to fill the void.

The attempt to sanction the Burmese government through a UN Security Council resolution last January was also bound to fail. It was opposed by China and Russia because it yet again smacked of interventionism under yet another pretext of “threat to world security,” when clearly and tragically the junta represents at most a threat to its own citizens.

After Iraq, we should not be surprised if countries this time demand incontrovertible proof to support threat claims by certain Western powers.

Human rights, democracy

Since geopolitical interests appear to take center stage in how most regional states view Burma, the challenge for democracy activists and advocates of human rights is how to persuade these players that democracy and human rights in Burma are in their interests, too.

For Asean, the argument has long been made that its credibility, unity and ability to progress together will depend on its success in becoming a cohesive, institutionalized, rules-based organization sharing a common vision and common principles.

While it is not for Asean or any other country to define Burma’s political system, Asean’s principles of peaceful settlement of disputes, consultation and consensus-building, reliance on dialogue and accommodation or harmonization of diverse interests, mutual respect, and its more recent commitment to social justice and the vision of a “caring society” can and should also very well guide state-society relations within individual member countries.

For China, continuous association with what may become a long, drawn-out repression and potential violence by the military junta could eventually cast a shadow over the democracy debate in China, bringing to a head as well the growing tensions between China’s two faces: the China that is externally domineering and internally repressive toward its own people versus the China that is highly civilized, and a responsible and respected great power.

Moreover, like India, if China ends up on the wrong side of history should the pro-democracy forces in Burma ultimately prevail, then it stands to lose its influence over any new government in Rangoon.

What may be done?

Both Western sanctions and Asean constructive engagement have failed to reform Burma’s military leaders. On the other hand, support by China, India and other governments as well as corporations have apparently helped sustain corruption and repression and are becoming a major source of embarrassment, what with the images of dead monks and of the military firing into unarmed crowds.

At this point, only a multilateral, concerted and collective effort demanding a peaceful approach by government to the protests, and an immediate return to political dialogue with the opposition, may work.

Possible mediation by a neutral third party (preferably from outside the region, but supported by Asean, China, India, the United States and Britain) might help. These minimalist demands are based only on the lowest common denominator for these countries, but the multi-lateralist concerted approach allows for the mitigation of policy dilemmas for the individual states.

Release Suu Kyi

In the meantime, however, individual leaders, governments, NGOs, prominent personalities, and others may continue to issue more specific demands, including the release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, other prisoners of conscience, and of arrested demonstrators, or urgent action on a new constitution.

The Asean + 3, employing the additional economic leverage of Japan and Korea, might consider extending specific assistance for the alleviation of the economic crisis hitting citizens of Burma, but this should be conditional on political dialogue and reserving the primary role for NGOs, non-state actors and international organizations in the implementation of assistance programs.

As events throughout Burma are still unfolding, such predictions, prescriptions and recommendations may prove premature. But because the internal conflict in Burma appears to be moving farther away from resolution with each passing day, faced with the now legendary obduracy of the ruling junta, and because any further loss of life is too high a price to pay, the peoples of the world, including Filipinos or maybe especially Filipinos, must pay attention now.

(Aileen S.P. Baviera is the dean of Asian Center, University of the Philippines Diliman. The paper is based on remarks she delivered at the forum “Burma in Crisis: the Saffron Revolution,” on Oct. 5 at the Asian Center.)

Sanctions

European Union

* Arms embargo
* Ban on nonhumanitarian aid
* Visa ban for senior regime officials and their families
* Freeze on assets held in Europe by people on the visa ban list
* Limited investment ban
* Embargo on the export of wood, gems and metals

United States

* Investment ban
* Import ban
* Blocking of property and property interests of Burma’s senior officials
* Ban on exportation of financial services (insurance, banking services, loans, etc.)

Japan

* Cancellation of grants of about $4.7 million

Inquirer Research

Top 3 trading partners (2006)


 Imports: $3.9 billion
 China 34.0 percent
 Thailand 21.4
 Singapore 15.8


Exports: $ 4.4 billion
Thailand 49.0 percent
India 12.1
China 5.3


Source: IHT/IMF